NEW CONCEPTS IN CUSTOMER AND
TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS-THE
SCHWINN AND SEALY DOCTRINES
S. POWELL BRIDGES*

Recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Company and United States v. Sealy, Incorporated have
raised new questions concerning the legality of customer and territorial restrictions imposed on dealers, distributors, franchisees,
and licensees by manufacturers. In this article the author analyzes
these cases and concludes that attacks on customer and territorial
restrictions will be more effective in the future and, to avoid
government prosecution and treble damage actions by private
litigants, businessmen and lawyers should be cautious in the use
of such restraints.

W HEN lawyers or businessmen refer to "exclusive

contracts,"
"exclusive territories," or "exclusive dealerships," what precisely is meant? The terms can mean either an agreement by a
manufacturer with its distributor prohibiting the manufacturer from
selling to any others within the distributor's "exclusive" territory,
or an agreement by a manufacturer with its distributor that the
distributor will not sell to purchasers located outside an "exclusive"
territory. Agreements of the first type, if ancillary to the sale of
goods for resale, have consistently been upheld as reasonable protection for the distributor's property rights in his resale business,
since the manufacturer can neither undersell the distributor nor
establish a competitor of the distributor.1 Emphasized in this
article are agreements in the second category, which allocate markets
among competitors and which have sometimes been held to violate
the Sherman Act. Some agreements refer to "closed territories,"
"areas of primary responsibility," or "zones of influence;" and de* B.S. 1954, Davidson College; LL.B. 1957, Vanderbilt University; Member, Illinois
Bar.
, Such agreements reflect reasonable refusals to sell which are legal under the
Sherman Act. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956); United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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pending on the intent of the parties, they may also denote "exclusive
territories." 2 The balance of the article considers both "horizontal" and "vertical,"3 foreign and domestic, "exclusive" territorial
and customer restrictions, regardless of the designation given them,
with particular emphasis on the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company,4 which
delineated new guideposts in this area of the law. Some practical
rules, based on Arnold, Schwinn & Company and other recent cases,
appear at the conclusion.
THE SCHWINN CASE

In 1952, Schwinn, a family-owned business engaged in the manufacture and sale of bicycles, parts, and accessories, began a franchise
marketing plan to increase retailers' promotion of Schwinn bicycles
and insure quality service and sales. Under the "Schwinn Plan,"
Schwinn shipped directly to retail dealers who were invoiced and
extended credit by Schwinn, and Schwinn then paid a commission
to the distributor taking the orders. These dealers were franchised for designated locations; they could sell only to consumers
and were not permitted to act as agents for unfranchised dealers or
discount houses; their number in any area was limited; and they
could purchase only through a Schwinn distributor. Sales were
also made to dealers by means of agency or consignment arrangements with distributors. Finally, sales were made to distributors
who could sell only in specific territories and to franchised Schwinn
dealers. Distributors and dealers were never restricted from selling
other brands of bicycles; and, except in so-called "fair trade" states,
dealers were not restricted as to price. Schwinn was "firm and resolute," but it had not cancelled the franchises of retailers for sales
I In United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71,751 (E.D. Pa.), a consent decree
permitted the use of "area of primary responsibility" to protect Philco's right to select
its customers, but the decree did not allow Philco to interfere with the distributors'
right to sell where and to whomever they chose. In Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943), General Motors was
allowed to prohibit Chevrolet dealers from establishing sales outlets outside their
"zones of influence."
9 "Horizontal" agreements among competing manufacturers, distributors, or dealers,
see, e.g., Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E.2d
940 (1936) (price-fixing), should be distinguished from "vertical" agreements affecting
only a manufacturer and its distributors or dealers, e.g., Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental
Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949) (resale price maintenance).
'388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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through discount houses or unfranchised retailers. Similarly, no
distributors had been cut off for sales outside the restricted territory.
In 1966 about 75% of Schwinn's bicycle sales were made under
the "Schwinn Plan" through its twenty-two distributors and 5,000
to 6,000 franchised retail dealers. When the "Schwinn Plan" was
first instituted, Schwinn had 22.5% of the retail bicycle market
in the United States. Ten years later its gross sales had increased
but its percentage of the market decreased to 12.8%. Other competitors, such as Sears Roebuck & Co. and Montgomery Ward & Co.,
substantially increased their share of the market during this period.
The Government charged that Schwinn had entered a pricefixing conspiracy, allocated exclusive territories to distributors, and
restricted sales to franchised dealers only.5 The district court, while
rejecting the price-fixing charge, held the territorial limitation to be
unlawful per se with respect to products sold by Schwinn to distributors, but upheld the customer limitation on distributors and
the limitations on sales by Schwinn to franchised dealers under the
"Schwinn Plan" where distributors functioned as agents or consignees. 6 Only the latter holding was appealed to the Supreme
Court.7
In its 5-to-2 majority opinion, the Court labelled this a "vertical,"
not a "horizontal" restriction,8 and found that Schwinn had unilaterally imposed restrictions which affected only intra-brand competition.9 The Court refused to allow the legality of the arrangement to turn on whether Schwinn's motives were for "nonpredatory, business profit" purposes. 10 The "rule of reason" rationale
enunciated in White Motor Company v. United States" was not
applied since Schwinn "was not a newcomer, seeking to break into
or stay in the bicycle business," nor was it "a 'failing company.' "12
The Court stated that such restrictions "may be permissible in an
uId. at 367.

6United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
8

3888 U.S. at 368.
Id. at 372.

Id.at 378. "Intra-brand" competition, involving similar items with the same brand
name, should be distinguished from "inter-brand" competition, involving similar items
of different manufacturers and with different brand names. See generally Preston.
Restrictive DistributionArrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards,
30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 506, 508 (1965).
10 388 U.S. at 375.

U.S. 253 (1963).
388 U.S. at 374.

1-372
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TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS

Vol. 1967: 1156]

1159

appropriate and impelling competitive setting" in the "unusual" as
opposed to the "ordinary" sale and distribution of products3 3a
Relying on White Motor Company14 and Dr. Miles Medical
Company v. John D. Park & Sons,15 the Court distinguished Schwinn's
"vertical" restraints from "horizontal" restraints, such as those in
Klor's, Incorporatedv. Broadway-Hale Stores, Incorporated16 (combination of manufacturers) and United States v. General Motors
Corporation'7 (combination of distributors),"' and held that the
district court decree should be revised on remand to enjoin not only
territorial limitations on sales to distributors, but also sales to both
distributors and dealers upon "any condition, agreement or understanding limiting [their] freedom as to where and to whom [they]
will resell the products."'' 9 The Court stated:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with
which an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted
with dominion over it.20

Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted
with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred
--whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a "per se" violation of § I of the
21
Sherman Act.

is Id. at

379.
",White Motor Company attempted to justify its restrictions on dealers' and distributors' territories and customers by the need to encourage "inter-brand," rather than
"intra-brand," competition and the need to resist fierce competition from larger competitors. The Supreme Court agreed with the Government's position that such "vertical" restrictions could be per se violations of the Sherman Act, but the case was remanded for further study of the industry and competition therein to determine if
these circumstances justified use of the "rule of reason." 372 U.S. at 263-64.
Is220 U.S. 373 (1911). In this case Dr. Miles Company consigned unpatented proprietary drug products to 400 jobbers, who could sell only to designated retailers at
certain prices. The retailers also were restricted by contract with Dr. Miles Company
to sell only at "full retail" prices and not to sell to jobbers or wholesalers not approved
by the company. The Supreme Court found these restrictions on retailers, after title
had passed, to be unreasonable restraints of trade aimed at maintaining prices and preventing competition, but upheld the restrictions on jobber-consignees.
16 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
11384 U.S. 127 (1966).

8388 U.S. at 373-78.
'Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
21 Id. at 382.
20
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As to Schwinn's sales to retailers by consignment or agency
arrangements through distributors under the "Schwinn Plan," the
Court, relying on Simpson v. Union Oil Company,22 held that the
"rule of reason," 23 not a "per se" rule, should be applied. 24 Similarly, the Court found that Schwinn's restrictions under the "Schwinn
Plan," agency, or consignment were reasonable since:
1. Other bicycles, reasonably interchangeable as articles of competitive commerce, were available to distributors and dealers.
2. Schwinn's distributors and dealers actually handled other
brands of bicycles.
3. There was no price-fixing involved.
4. The trial court found that competition had made necessary
the challenged program, and the net effect of the program was
25
to preserve rather than harm competition.
The dissent emphasized the district court's finding as to the
ultimate effect of Schwinn's policies, 26 and preferred to apply the
"rule of reason" to the customer and territorial restrictions in
Schwinn's sales, consignment, agency, and "Schwinn Plan" distribution. 27
FoREIGN TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS

To understand the application of the Schwinn "per se" rule to
foreign transactions, 28 one should know that both foreign and domestic commerce are included in the Sherman Act definition of
"commerce,"2 9 and that the courts of the United States have juris-2

377 U.S. 13 (1964). Union Oil used consignments of gasoline and leases for service

stations throughout eight western states to control Simpson's and its other gasoline

dealers' retail prices. The Supreme Court held that the consignment selling arrangement did not justify Union Oil's "coercive" practices to maintain retail prices in "a
vast gasoline distribution system," and found these restraints unreasonable in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 21-22.
23 This rule, which weighs the "equities" after the motives of the parties and the
effect on the market have been determined, was read into the Sherman Act by the
Supreme Court in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), and
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
24388 U.S. at 380-81.
2 Id. at 381-82.

26 See id. at 384 (dissenting opinion).

27 See id. at 385-86.
28 In United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), the Court firmly asserted that the "per se" doctrine would be applied equally to foreign and domestic
"commerce."

20 Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act states: "Every contract, combination in
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diction over all United States corporations, regardless of where their
business is done, and over all foreign corporations located or owning
property within the United States. 0
American businessmen have for years been apprehensive when
territorial restrictions are used in foreign distributorship agreements,
but there have been no United States cases in which such restrictions
have been held illegal. One reason for this lack of judicial attention
is that most foreign dealers or distributors are local in their selling
area. However, with world trade increasing, foreign distributors
frequently purchase products from United States manufacturers and
resell these in competition with the manufacturer's domestic distributors. Similarly, many distributors in the United States are
expanding sales to foreign countries. Territorial restrictions on
such distributors would have a definite effect on the foreign "commerce" of the United States. Further, many foreign distributors
have offices in the United States, thus subjecting them, as well as
their United States supplier, to the terms of the Sherman Act and
jurisdiction of the local courts. Unless there is present some
"appropriate and impelling competitive setting," 31 the Arnold,
Schwinn & Company case now makes restrictions on the territory
or customers of foreign distributor-purchasers "per se" violations of
the Sherman Act. The "rule of reason" is no longer applicable to
such restrictions.
When licensing is involved and the litigants are not competitors,
the courts have looked favorably on reasonable territorial restrictions.
2
In Foundry Services, Incorporatedv. Beneflux Corporation," a New
York corporation obtained certain trade secrets pertaining to fluxes
used in casting molten metal from an English corporation. Under
the agreement the New York corporation was given an exclusive
license to manufacture and sell these fluxes in the United States and
Canada. The New York corporation sought to enjoin the English
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
... 15 U.S.C. § 1
the several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal.
(1964).
80 United States courts have jurisdiction over foreign corporations with property or
subsidiaries in the United States. For example, in United States v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
1940-43 Trade Cas. 683 (D.N.J. 1941), Chemical and Pharmaceutical Enterprises, Ltd.,
through its controlled Swiss subsidiary, was required to divest itself of stock in
Schering Corporation of New Jersey.
31388 U.S. at 379.

"2110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rerfd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953).
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corporation from competing with it in the United States. The
court found this restrictive territorial conduct ancillary to a valid
primary purpose-to prohibit the licensor of a secret process from
competing with its single licensee in the assigned area and to be free
from the latter's interference elsewhere. The court distinguished
the case at bar from Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United
States33 and other "horizontal" conspiracies among competitors to
allocate world markets, which have consistently been held "per se"
34
illegal.
It should be noted, however, that the Arnold, Schwinn & Company Court did not extend the "per se" rule to patent licensing.35
The rights of patentees were established in several cases allowing
patent owners to control the sales territory, price, and quality of
manufacture of patented products.3 6 The licensing of a trademark
does not justify territorial restrictions on the licensees when pricefixing, allocation of world markets, or monopolization are also present; but the use of trademarks can be reasonably controlled to protect
7
the licensor's trademark rights..

DOMESTIC TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS

Until about 1950 the Justice Department had not challenged a
"vertical" restriction on customers or territories standing alone.
However, during the late 1940's and following, several consent
decrees were obtained in which the defendants agreed to cease "vertical" territorial restrictions.3 8 Except for the more serious customer
33341 U.S. 593 (1951). This case represents a classic "horizontal" conspiracy to
allocate markets through exclusive territories. Timken, producer of 75% of the roller
bearings sold in the United States, and its French and English subsidiaries, allocated
territories among themselves, fixed prices, and cooperated to protect their markets from
outside competition. The Court, rejecting Timken's claim that they were merely exercising their right to license the "Timken" trademark, found allocation of territories
the central purpose of the agreements and held that the agreements were so prejudicial to the public interest that they were unreasonable and illegal "per se." Id. at
598-99.
31See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
35388 U.S. at 379 n.6.
36 See United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476
(1926).
37See cases cited note 34 supra.
38E.g., United States v. J.P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. 72,476 (N.D. Ill.);
United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71,751 (E.D. Pa.); United States v.

Vol. 1967:1156]

TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS

1163

or territorial restriction cases, which also involved group boycotts,
price-fixing, or monopolization of other types as an integral part of
the restrictions, 9 the courts and the Federal Trade Commission, until the Arnold, Schwinn & Company case, had found "vertical"
customer or territorial restrictions to be legal. 40
After the Justice Department's insistence during the 1950's that
"vertical" customer or territorial restrictions were per se illegal,
lawyers and businessmen in 1961 welcomed the first test case, United
States v. White Motor Company,4' in which the Government charged
that the defendant, a manufacturer of trucks and parts, had acted
unlawfully by entering into identical contracts with about 300
dealers and distributors. The arrangements provided for restrictions on customers and territories and allowed fixing of prices on
sales to the Government, certain national accounts, and about 5%o
of distributor sales to dealers. The district court entered summary
judgment, holding that the price-fixing and territorial and customer
restrictions were all illegal "per se."'42 On appeal of the customer
and territorial restriction issues only, the Supreme Court held that
Austenal Laboratories, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 64,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States
v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,903 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,802 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
39In a landmark case, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1899), an agreement among competing corporations in the iron pipe industry to eliminate all competition among themselves when bidding for contracts in certain territories
was found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Similar restrictions involving group boycotts have been held illegal, e.g., United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), as well as horizontal price-fixing, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), and vertical price-fixing, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
"0E.g., Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co.,
291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923); Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 F. 280 (5th Cir. 1915),
cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918); Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 F. 593
(8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904); Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv.
Co. v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960); United States v.
Newbury Mfg. Co., 36 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1941); General Cigar Co., 16 F.T.C. 537
(1932); Revlon Prods. Corp. v. Bernstein, 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1955); Hickock Mfg. Co. v. Fairley Trading
Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
"1194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
" Id. at 585-87.
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summary judgment was improperly granted and that the legality of
3
these arrangements should be determined at trial
The Court distinguished White Motor Company from United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Company,44 on the ground that the
restrictions in the latter case were ancillary to price-fixing which
was " 'an integral part of the whole distribution system,' ",45 and
from Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States46 since the
arrangement there was "horizontal" among competitors rather than
"vertical." 47 Holding that these "vertical" restrictions must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine if the "rule of reason"
applies, the Court remanded to the lower court.48 Before the case
was reheard, however, White Motor Company changed its distribution process to comply with the Government's position, and a
consent decree was entered. 49 The three dissenting Justices, consistent with the Arnold, Schwinn & Company decision, found that
the customer and territorial restrictions were illegal "per se."50
After White Motor Company, customer and territorial restrictions were again considered in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Company,51 in which the district court found that an agreement
between Pennsalt and Olin limiting Olin's sodium sales to certain
pulp and paper mills in the Southeast was not an unreasonable
restriction. The Justice Department did not appeal this holding.
In Snap-On Tools Corporation v. FTC,5 2 the Federal Trade
Commission had held that Snap-On Tools had unlawfully allocated
exclusive sales territories to dealers and had prevented them from
selling to certain accounts. On appeal these restrictions were found
to be reasonable on the grounds that they were necessary to maintain adequate sales representation and service. Further, no monopoly was present and the suppression of competition was not
8372
"21
"8 372
, 341
,7372

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

253 (1963).
707 (1944).
at 260.
593 (1951).
at 261.

"8Id. at 261-63. The Court stated: "[W]e know too little of the actual impact
of both that [territorial] restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us." Id. at 261.
"1United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 79,762 (N.D. Ohio).
50 372 U.S. at 275 (dissenting opinion).
851217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
821 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
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significant.53

The Sixth Circuit followed Snap-On Tools in finding
under similar circumstances that restricted distributors' territories
were reasonable in Sandura Company v. FTC.54
55 General Motors conspired with
In General Motors Corporation,
three trade associations, composed of all eighty-five Chevrolet dealers
in the Los Angeles area, to force twelve of the dealers to discontinue
Chevrolet sales through discount houses. After receiving complaints
from its dealers facing increased sales and price competition, General
Motors personnel talked with the twelve dealers and obtained
promises that they would comply with the "location clauses" in their
distributor contracts prohibiting dealers from establishing new
"sales" locations without the automaker's approval. After these
promises were obtained, the trade associations, in cooperation with
General Motors, policed dealer sales to insure discontinuance of
sales through discount houses. No conspiracy was found by the
lower court since the parties had acted independently in "parallel"
activity.5 6 The Supreme Court, relying on Klor's, Incorporatedand
United States v. Parke, Davis & Company,57 held that this was
a classic "boycott" conspiracy to eliminate one class of competition,
with price restraint inherent therein 58-a "per se" restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act. Distinguishing unilateral "vertical" restrictions cases, the Court relied on conspiracy, and found it
unnecessary to determine either the validity of the "location clause"
in the dealer contracts or whether General Motors could have unilaterally enforced this clause to prohibit sales through discount
houses in the Los Angeles area.5 9
In a recent case, United States v. Sealy, Incorporated,0 Sealy,
which was owned and controlled by thirty licensees of the "Sealy"
trademark, agreed with these licensee-manufacturers not to license
other manufacturers in each licensee's territory. The licensees in
return agreed not to manufacture or sell Sealy products outside
their designated areas. Products made under other trade names,
60 Id. at 830-37.
5,839 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
3884 U.S. 127 (1966).
56 United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85, 87-89 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
8362 U.S. 29 (1960).
38384 U.S. at 140.
5 Id. at 142-48.
-0 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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however, could be sold anywhere. In addition, Sealy and its licenseestockholders fixed and policed prices at which retailers sold Sealy
products. The Government charged Sealy with violation of section
I of the Sherman Act by conspiring with its licensees to fix prices
at which retail dealers could sell bedding products bearing the
"Sealy" trademark, and to allocate mutually exclusive territories
among such licensees. 61 Although the district court held that the
conspiracy to fix minimum retail prices violated the Sherman Act,0 2
Sealy did not appeal this determination. However, it was also held
that the Government failed to prove an unreasonable restraint of
trade with respect to the conspiracy to allocate mutually exclusive
territories among licensees6 3 This latter holding was appealed
by the Government.
Finding that the territorial restrictions emanated from a "horizontal" conspiracy among Sealy and its licensees, 64 the Supreme
Court refused to apply the "rule of reason" on the basis that the
combination of price-fixing and territorial exclusiveness brought this
case within the "per se" rationale of Timken Roller Bearing Company.65 The dissent argued that the Sealy arrangement represented
a "vertical" rather than "horizontal" restriction, 6 and that since
"intrabrand" competition might be harmful to "interbrand" competition, the restriction was within the "rule of reason."0 7
CONCLUSIONS
The recent Arnold, Schwinn & Company decision presents a
sharp turn in the law as applied to "vertical" customer or territorial
restrictions, since it holds that under ordinary circumstances customer or territorial restrictions on a dealer or distributor are "per
se" violations of the Sherman Act when the manufacturer sells to
the dealer or distributor and does not retain title to the product and
assumes no risk of loss. After this decision and Sealy, Incorporated,
government attacks on customer and territorial restrictions imposed
on dealers, distributors, franchisees, and licensees will be more effec6

Id. at 351.

62 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,070, at 80,107 (N.D. 111.).

al Id. at 80,106-07.
a, 388 U.S. at 354-56.
',Id. at 357-58.
6 Id. at 358 (dissenting opinion).
17Id. at 359-60.
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tive and extensive. The increased potentiality of government
prosecution and treble damages from private litigation should lead
to cautious use of such restrictions. Under Arnold, Schwinn &
Company, manufacturers should consider using customer or territorial restrictions in selling through dealers or distributors in a
truly "vertical" arrangement only if one of the following conditions
exists: (1) the manufacturer owns the dealers or distributors; (2)
the restrictions do not, and will not, affect the foreign or domestic
"commerce" of the United States; (3) the manufacturer consigns
products to dealers or distributors with title retained and risks
assumed by the manufacturer; (4) the manufacturer retains title
and assumes risks in an agency relationship with dealers or distributors; or (5) some unusual "competitive setting" exists, such
as a "newcomer manufacturer seeking to break into or stay in
business" or a "failing company" attempting to survive. If either
the first or second condition exists, customer or territorial restrictions can undoubtedly be used; if the third or fourth condition is
present, the "rule of reason" makes such restrictions legal when the
manufacturer and its distribution system are not dominant, pricefixing or similar antitrust restraints are not also present, the restrictions are jusitfied and made necessary by competition, and the net
effect of the restrictions is to preserve and not to damage competition. Of course, if the fifth condition clearly exists, the "rule of
reason" makes the restrictions legal. However, if none of these five
conditions are present, restrictions on foreign or domestic dealers
or distributors that control them as to customers, or that assign
"exclusive territories, .... areas of primary responsibility," or "zones
of influence," if in fact restrictions on the purchaser's resale of the
product, are "per se" illegal, and should be amended or avoided in
the future.
The decision in Sealy, Incorporatedconfirms past Supreme Court
decisions making "horizontal" agreements or conspiracies illegal
"per se" if they involve price-fixing and restrictions on customers or
territories. Although price-fixing and customer and territorial restrictions were present in Sealy, Incorporated, the Court's holding
would undoubtedly have been the same if price-fixing had not been
present, since all competition, price and otherwise, is eliminated by
customer or territorial restrictions, and the precedent for "per se"
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illegality for "horizontal" conspiracy among competitors is even
stronger than for the "vertical" customer or territorial restrictions
found to be illegal "per se" in Arnold, Schwinn & Company. Thus,
excluding restrictions involving the reasonable exploitation of
patents or trademarks, limitations involving unusual circumstances,
such as the establishment of a joint venture by non-dominant or
non-competitive companies, or restrictions that do not and will
not affect the foreign or domestic "commerce" of the United States,
all customer or territorial restrictions among competitors should be
avoided.
Manufacturers can sometimes accomplish "exclusive territory"
objectives by refusing to sell to more than one distributor or dealer
in a geographical "trading area." Although the selected distributor
or dealer cannot be restricted to a specific "trading area," frequently
the product itself, after-sale service requirements, financial condition of the dealer or distributor, or other factors standing alone
restrict the dealer's or distributor's selling territory. Under these
circumstances manufacturers may be able to legally select their
customers to take advantage of restrictions inherent in the customer's
business.

